



procedural steps in the case relating to the finalization of the commitment order. According to Plaintiff, his federal constitutional rights to due process were violated when the state trial court proceeded with the SVP process despite the problematic filing and when, on appeal and petition for writ of certiorari, the state appellate courts affirmed the commitment order without making any findings addressing his claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* Complaint filed by Plaintiff in this case. The review was conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (as amended), and other provisions in the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

This Court is required to construe *pro se* complaints liberally. Such *pro se* complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, \_\_ U.S. \_\_, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007); *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of New York*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The requirement of liberal construction, however, does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See *Weller v. Department of Social Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).<sup>1</sup> Even

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<sup>1</sup>The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the Plaintiff could prevail, it should  
(continued...)

under this less stringent standard, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff's claims about the subject matter jurisdiction of the state courts and the constitutionality of the procedures utilized by the state court system under the applicable civil commitment statutes are subject to summary dismissal without service on Defendant because this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider them. The proceedings and rulings made in the Anderson County Court of Common Pleas, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, and the South Carolina Supreme Court cannot be reviewed or set aside or "dismissed" by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in this case. *See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983)( a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.).<sup>2</sup> *See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This prohibition on review of state court orders by federal district courts is commonly referred to as the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine or the *Feldman-Rooker* doctrine. *See, e.g., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280 (2005); *Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transport.*, 434 F.3d 712 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006); *Ivy Club v. Edwards*, 943 F.2d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 1991).

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<sup>1</sup>(...continued)

do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, *Barnett v. Hargett*, 174 F.3d 1128 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, *Small v. Endicott*, 998 F.2d 411 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985).

<sup>2</sup>Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court. Secondly, the Congress, for more than two hundred years, has provided that only *the Supreme Court of the United States* may review a decision of a state's highest court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1257(since 1988, such Supreme Court review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right); *see Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs.*, 108 F.3d 486, 491(3d Cir. 1997) . In civil, criminal, and other cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that were properly brought before it under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 or that statute's predecessors. *E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003 (1991) (an example of a South Carolina Supreme Court case that was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court).

Because the *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine is jurisdictional it may be raised by the Court *sua sponte*. *American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell*, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003).

Longstanding precedents preclude the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina from reviewing the findings or rulings made by the South Carolina State Courts. The *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues such as Plaintiff attempts to raise in this case. *See Arthur v. Supreme Court of Iowa*, 709 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Iowa 1989). Plaintiff's submission of the Complaint in this case, claiming a right to dismissal of the civil commitment order and releases from the BDTP program due to procedural errors allegedly made by the State and the court during the commitment case makes clear that Plaintiff is, in reality, attempting to have this Court review the proceedings that took place at each level of the state courts. *See Anderson v. Colorado*, 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986)("[I]t is well settled that federal district courts are without authority to review state court judgments where the relief sought is in the nature of appellate review."); *see also Hagerty v. Succession of Clement*, 749 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984)(collecting cases). Plaintiff is clearly claiming that he has been injured by the state court decisions, *see Willner v. Frey*, No. 06-1432, 2007 WL 222778 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. August 3, 2007), and to rule in favor of Plaintiff on his constitutional claims would, necessarily, require this Court to overrule (or otherwise find invalid) various orders and rulings made in Anderson County Court of Common Pleas and thereafter in the state appellate courts. Such a result is prohibited under the *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine. *Davani*, 434 F.3d at 719-20; *see Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. at 293-94; *Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va.*, 122 F.3d at 201.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint in this case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. *See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715

(1966); *see also* *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

s/Joseph R. McCrorey  
United States Magistrate Judge

December 26, 2007  
Columbia, South Carolina

### **Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
901 Richland Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).